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There is something anomalous in the spectacle of the nations of the earth, great and small, making prodigious sacrifices in their zeal for military and naval armaments, while at the same time they are coöperating in a campaign to further the effectiveness of peaceful arbitration as a solution of international differences. In considering only the eight leading military powers, it is found that the vast total of nearly two billion dollars is spent annually by them for army and navy. The lesser powers are also spending more lavishly than ever before. Yet, notwithstanding the fact, as stated by Lord Rosebery, that never before has there been, in the history of the world, "so threatening and overpowering a preparation for war," monarchs and statesmen are perpetually indulging in platitudes on the blessings of peace. Arbitral tribunals are steadily gaining in prestige, peace societies are extending their influence, and public-spirited citizens, notable among whom is Mr. Carnegie, are endowing the cause of international peace.

Among the latest aspirants to naval prowess are the autonomous dominions of the British Empire. Their tardiness has been due in the first place to the implicit trust of the Colonial in the power of the British fleet to protect him from all external

foes; and, in the second place, the inhabitant of Canada and Australasia has been too much engrossed in developing his virgin country to have a thought for naval matters. Of late, however, the over-seas dominions have experienced an awakening induced by the recent "naval crisis" in England. They are beginning to understand that the fate of the British Empire depends mainly on armored ships. They realize that the widely scattered parts of the Empire, aptly called "the unorganized maritime confederacy," are "linked together by one sea, since all seas are one." Tennyson's statement that "The fleet of England is her all in all" might appropriately be revised for, in truth, the fleet of England is the Empire's all in all.

The present naval activity of Canada and her sister dominions is the latest expression of that spirit of colonial nationalism which has come to be regarded as undoubtedly the strongest force in British colonial politics. The instinct of nationality has had an increasing influence upon the political evolution of the British Empire since the time of the confederation of the Canadian provinces, in 1867. The national idea is discernible in different stages of development in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa depending on conditions which vary in each case. Strange as it may seem the dominions have adopted naval policies which for the most part are dissimilar. Notwithstanding the real alarm occasioned in the British Isles by the "German scare," and in spite of the naval taxes already burdening the British tax payer the mother-country cannot, at any rate does not, dictate to the colonies in this matter. The navy issue attests, in a significant manner, the genuineness of the self-government enjoyed by the autonomous states. Although still under the sovereignty of the Crown they possess practically all the rights of independent nations. Their freedom from compulsion is instanced by their differing naval programs. Early in 1909, as a result of Britain's alarm over her threatened naval supremacy, New Zealand's loyalty expressed itself in an offer, to the mother-country, of funds to cover in full the construction of a *Dreadnought*. In Australia, it was popularly urged, at first, that the Commonwealth duplicate the gift of

New Zealand. Instead, provisions have been made for the establishment of an Australian squadron. The ships are to be built in Great Britain at the expense of the Commonwealth. Although the British government will contribute for some years towards the expense of construction, the fleet eventually will be under the control of the Australian government. South Africa, by reason of its recent unification, has as yet not departed from the policy of making voluntary cash contributions to Great Britain towards the support of the royal navy. This plan has been followed for some years by Cape Colony and Natal. The policy adopted by Canada is distinctively nationalistic. The proposed navy is to be built in Canada and manned and wholly controlled by the Dominion.

Canada enjoys a degree of hegemony over the younger nations of the empire in all matters involving the imperial connection. Such leadership rests on more than the mere accident of national seniority. The more rapid development of Canadian nationalism has been the result, in large measure, of the proximity of the United States. This spirit of nationality has shown itself in the distinctly protectionist tariff policy of the Dominion and in stringent immigration regulations, under which even citizens of the British Isles are refused admission if failing to measure up to the required standard. Among the many expressions of such a spirit, however, none has been more striking than that illustrated by the attitude of the Dominion on the question of Empire defence. Canada has, at no time, contributed towards the support of the British navy, in which respect it occupies a unique position. On the other hand, the voluntary contributions of the other dominions were increased as a result of the Colonial Conference of 1902. The Commonwealth of Australia has been contributing \$1,000,000 annually; the subsidy paid by New Zealand was enlarged in 1908 from \$200,000 to \$500,000; while Cape Colony and Natal grant annually \$230,000 and \$175,000 respectively. The Canadian Premier, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, stated at the Conference of 1902 that the Dominion government was "contemplating the establishment of a local naval force in the waters of Canada," but that

it was "not able to make any offer of assistance analogous to those enumerated above." This unwillingness to offer cash subsidies in behalf of Empire defence has not been based on disloyalty nor on any other unworthy motive. On the contrary, Canada has adhered to the principle that a more real benefit is conferred on the Empire at large by the development of improved transportation facilities and by undertaking the full responsibility of her own defence than by the payment of a small annual contribution. Not only has Canada performed a service of inestimable benefit to Great Britain by the construction of transcontinental railway systems, making possible a rapid dispatch of British troops from ocean to ocean, but the Dominion, for some years, has garrisoned and supported Halifax and Esquimaux.

The disinclination of Canada to make cash contributions can also be attributed to the spirit of nationality which, as already mentioned, is more highly developed in Canada than in any other of the dominions. The principle of colonial contributions runs counter to the creed of the nationalist who guards zealously his much-prized rights of self-government. No less an Imperialist, however, than Lord Milner himself stated, in the course of an address before the Canadian Club of Toronto in October, 1908, that the most satisfactory solution of the problem of imperial defence was for each of the individual states to develop its own defensive resources. He argued further that the payment of cash contributions towards the support of a central navy was a short sighted policy, and would form a poor substitute for real Imperial partnership. The Canadian and Australian would take infinitely less interest in Imperial defence if they simply contributed sums of money to be spent invisibly in Great Britain, instead of having navies of their own taking shape under their eyes, and manned by their own people. By developing separate navies the total naval strength of the Empire will be increased by the extension of the Empire ship-building resources. Since the time will come, without question, when Great Britain will see herself outstripped in population and resources by her dominions, it is appropriate that a Canadian

naval policy be inaugurated without delay, humble though it may be. The direct contribution plan not only lessens the responsibility and interest of the Colonial in the question of Empire defence, but such a policy fails totally to build up in the dominions any defence resources of their own. It gives them no tangible returns for the contributions made. Admiral Lord Charles Beresford has concurred in the opinion as to the superiority of the separate navy plan. Without doubt Canada is as surely blazing the trail, which later will be followed by the younger dominions, in the matter of Imperial defence, as she did earlier with reference to the questions of confederation and preferential trade concessions to the mother-country.

The entire navy issue as existent in Canada today is based fundamentally on two root-ideas: 1. The Dominion is staunch in its determination to remain a member of the British Empire. 2. Canada is equally determined to retain, and possibly to increase, its autonomy as regards Great Britain. This seeming paradox is one of the monuments to British statesmanship. The British Empire is unique in the world's history in several respects, but in none more so than in the political status of the self-governing colonies of the Empire and in their attitude toward their parent state. In a word, the road of Canadian political development seems to be leading toward an independence accompanied by a voluntary continuance, by the Dominion, of a connection with Great Britain small though it may be. The ideal toward which present tendencies are pointing is a league of free states—Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa—which would be held together mainly by mutual advantages and partly by sentiment. Canada possessing nationhood and political equality with the United Kingdom, would coöperate in war and peace under agreed conditions as a member of the Empire partnership. "We are going to build the British Empire," declared Sir Wilfrid Laurier on July 25, 1910, in the course of an address in the Canadian West, "on the rock of local autonomy, and that local autonomy is consistent with Imperial unity." The same spirit of Canadianism blended with Empire loyalty marked the speech of

Sir A. B. Aylesworth, the Dominion Minister of Justice, before the Canadian Club of Halifax on December 22, 1910. "I hope that in the future Canada will seek to be a leading partner," he said, "in the galaxy of nations that will surround and uphold the British throne."

That in brief represents the essence of the spirit of colonial nationalism. If one will bear it in mind the Canadian naval policy will appear intelligible and entirely reasonable. The government of Canada committed itself during the year 1910 to a definite program of naval defence. It is proposed to construct four cruisers of the *Bristol* type and six destroyers of the improved river class. According to the official estimate the cost of these ships if built in Canada will be at least one-third more than if constructed in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, in conformity with the protectionist policy of the Dominion, they are to be built in Canada to stimulate the shipbuilding industry. As there are no shipyards at present in the Dominion capable of doing the work called for, British firms have been entitled to submit tenders, the Canadian government agreeing to subsidize their efforts to establish suitable shipbuilding plants in the country. The program also calls for the foundation in Halifax of a Royal Naval College, which will be formed along lines similar to the Military College at Kingston, Ontario. The government furthermore has secured, as training ships, from Great Britain the *Niobe* and the *Rainbow*. These vessels, the first installment of the naval policy, are now in service in Canadian waters. The government has stipulated that the Canadian navy may be "subject to the call of the British admiralty, provided always that within fifteen days the Dominion Parliament ratifies the call."

There is a common tendency in Canada to be contemptuous of small beginnings. Much can be said, however, for the Dominion policy of building ships, which, although inadequate for active service with the Mediterranean Fleet or Channel Squadron, will be entirely suitable to police Canadian trade-routes and fisheries. Canada is far from making her naval début in second-hand clothes as the Conservative organs seem

to imply. The *Dreadnought* type of warship will unquestionably follow, in due course, the dozen vessels provided for in the 1910 program. Another prevalent criticism of the policy has been that it is anti-British and separatist in spirit. This opinion is untenable, however, in the light of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's career and speeches and in view of the advocacy of separate navies and armies by such men as Lord Milner and Lord Charles Beresford. In the Premier's own words, "If the time ever comes, and may God forbid it, that the old home is in danger, our hearts and brawn will be ranged at her side against any enemy, no matter whence that foeman hails."

The naval program advanced by the opposition party—the Conservatives—provided that a large direct contribution be placed by the Dominion Parliament at the disposal of the British authorities to enable them to construct two battleships or armored cruisers of the latest *Dreadnought* type. The cost of making the contribution called for by the leader of the Conservative party would be \$25,000,000 or more. His proposal further provided that no permanent policy involving large future naval expenditures be entered upon until the same has been submitted to the Canadian people and has received their approval. The one effective argument in favor of the Conservative policy has been that it would place under the direct control of the British admiralty ships capable of taking their place in the line of battle. On the other hand, the "direct contribution plan" would take from the Canadian tax-payers \$25,000,000 as an initial offering and remove it beyond the control of the Dominion. This would establish a precedent which conceivably might become a source of serious friction in the future. The principle of contributing directly toward the support of the British navy is furthermore contrary to the spirit of evolution of England's partner states, which Kipling has called the "new nations within the Empire." With reference to the proposal of the Conservatives to refer the naval issue to the electorate for decision, it may be said, that notwithstanding the theoretical wisdom of such action, it is unnecessary. In the first place, the Militia Act of Canada, which for half a cen-

ture has made provision for the organization of a militia navy, gives authority to the Dominion to undertake the responsibility of naval defence. In the second place, there can be no longer any question as to the necessity of naval activity of some sort in the British dominions. The time-honored argument that the overwhelming supremacy of the British fleet renders it unnecessary for the colonies to take any active interest in naval affairs has lost its justification.

Such indifference to questions of defence may well be disturbed by recent developments. The British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Chamberlain, discussed the problem of Imperial defence with the colonial premiers assembled in London at the Colonial Conference in 1902. "The weary Titan," said Mr. Chamberlain, "staggers under the too vast orb of his fate. We (the United Kingdom) have borne the burden for many years. We think it time that our children should assist us to support it, and whenever you make the request to us, be very sure that we shall hasten gladly to call you to our councils." Somewhat more disquieting was a speech of the British Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) in May, 1909, to the effect that the two-power standard for the navy did not cover any longer those foreign navies which were based upon ports a long distance from England. The British Liberal party has to a measure repudiated the responsibility for the naval defence of the Empire.

Doubtless few would question the seriousness of this defence problem as it exists in the British Empire. Canada's merchant marine, which is large and growing, has as its sole protection the British fleet. Australia and New Zealand, twelve thousand miles from the mother-country, and South Africa, distant half as far, would be entirely at the mercy of England's hypothetical combatants except for the British navy, which in case of a world struggle would be called upon to patrol the accessible and relatively undefended coast of the United Kingdom. "If a foreign fleet held the mouth of the Thames," declared a naval expert in the *National Review*, July, 1909, "for twenty-four hours, no matter what might happen afterwards," England would suffer a blow from which she "might never wholly recover."

Lord Charles Beresford in an open letter, in September, 1910, to the prime minister on the navy question, stated that, "The position of affairs with regard to the naval defence of the Empire will three years hence be fraught with a danger whose gravity I believe it to be difficult to exaggerate." Hitherto the preponderating naval supremacy of Great Britain has guaranteed peace and security to the Empire. The last half decade, however, has effected a change in the state of affairs and the balance of power is about to be disturbed. The extensive naval programs of Germany, the United States, and other powers make obligatory greatly increased expenditures in Great Britain, if the two-power standard is even to be approximated. This necessitates a still heavier load being thrown on the already overburdened British taxpayer. The latter, furthermore, is facing an unequal competition in view of the fact that the populations of at least Germany and the United States, already much larger than that of the British Isles, are increasing rapidly. Accordingly it is evident that with the growing severity of such competition and the increasing need of protection in the Empire at large that Britain's dominions must share in some manner or other in the responsibility of Empire defence.

Although Sir Wilfrid Laurier's government succeeded in passing its naval bill, it was carried only in the face of strong opposition. Throughout the Dominion there exists, strange as it may seem, wide-spread popular indifference with respect to the naval issue. This apathy may be accounted for by the fact that Canadians "have lived so long in the vale of peace" that they regard war as foreign and barbaric "whose enormities are embalmed in history or hidden behind the haze of distance." The belief that Canada does not need a navy and cannot afford the luxury illustrates the popular attitude. It is also generally held that England does not need Canadian aid, although it is generously added that whenever Britain may need such help Canadians will gladly sacrifice men and money in her defence. This argument entirely overlooks the essential fact that a navy cannot be provided to order at the time of the crisis, but is the product of years of growth.

An element of opposition much more serious than mere unenlightened indifference is that of the French Canadian population. Although absolutely loyal to Great Britain, which has assured to him unusual political and religious privileges since the Quebec Act of 1774, the French Canadian has no attachment whatsoever for the Empire. He desires a permanent bond with Great Britain, the guardian of his cherished rights, on the present basis but as might naturally be expected, he is resolutely opposed to all phases of Imperialism. In the words of the brilliant leader of the French Canadian Nationalist party, Henri Bourassa, "the French Canadian does not feel that he has any duty to perform to the Empire," although he is ready to shed his blood in defence of the British flag *on the North American Continent*. Therefore, all proposals to contribute directly to the British navy, or to coöperate in establishing an Imperial navy, in the control of which Canada would have her rightful share, are unequivocally denounced by the French Canadian Nationalist, as a base attempt to drag the Dominion into a policy of Imperial militarism. Mr. Bourassa and his associates have represented the ultimate meaning of the navy issue in Canada as conscription, the sacrifice of the youths of Quebec on foreign battlefields, and the end of French Canadian privileges. Indeed, it was this ingenious interpretation of the question which defeated Sir Wilfrid Laurier's candidate in the Drummond—Arthabaska by-election in November, 1910.

The French Nationalist of Quebec may be said to be between the devil and the deep sea in this matter of naval defence. On the one hand, he refuses his approval of any scheme which savors of Imperial defence, fearing that such might involve Canada in wars occasioned possibly by Japanese designs on Australia or German ambitions in South Africa, even though the very existence of England and the Empire might be at stake. On the other hand, assuming the collapse of the British Empire that portion of Canada which would most keenly feel the disaster is his own province of Quebec. Certainly no other part of the Dominion would lose so many of the privileges which go to make up much of the daily life of the people. With the break-

up of the Empire, Canada would either become an independent but defenceless neighbor of the United States or it would be absorbed outright by the latter. In either case the French Canadian would find himself more under the influence of the Anglo-Saxon than he is at present, looking as he does today to Great Britain for his exceptional privileges guaranteed under the Quebec Act. In the event of American absorption of Canada, although the political aspirations and ideals of the English-speaking Canadian would be deeply wounded, he would continue nevertheless to live practically the same life as before. His religious position would not be affected, his children would attend the same schools as formerly, and his mother language would continue to be spoken in the courts and legislatures. On the other hand, the French Canadian of Quebec could hardly hope to retain under the American flag his exclusive French Catholic school system. His church would probably lose certain of the privileges at present enjoyed, and it is highly improbable that the French language would be officially recognized in Congressional debates. It is undoubtedly true that this phase of the question has not been presented to the rank and file of the French voters of Quebec. Of the two alternative evils facing the French Nationalists in this navy issue, either coöperating in the naval defence of the Empire or suffering the consequences of a possible break-up of the Empire, Mr. Bourassa and his lieutenants have chosen to risk the danger which appears the less imminent. Accordingly their influence is thrown against any scheme of Canadian participation in naval activity.

In view of this attitude of the French Canadian inhabitants, forming nearly one third of the population of the Dominion, the naval policy of the government is practically the only feasible one. Obviously a Canadian navy program is less objectionable to Quebec than either the cash contribution plan or the proposal to establish a true Imperial navy. Fortunately, too, the policy of a separate Canadian navy is also most in keeping with the principle of an unfettered and healthy development of Imperial relations. To be sure, from the purely British naval point of view, the doctrine of local defence contemplating separate

colonial squadrons is short sighted. The ideal of the British admiralty would be one common fleet for the whole Empire under one controlling and representative authority, just as there is one fleet for all the autonomous states of the German Empire and one fleet for all the states of the American Union. The decision of the British colonies has been characterized as "a policy of pride and prejudice—pride in nationality rather than in Empire, the small unit instead of the big; and prejudice against any large-spirited concession by the small units, the nations, in order to strengthen the larger unit, the Empire, by the most effective and economical means."

Such reasoning, however, overlooks the most notable element in British Empire relations, an element which has brought about the most unique Imperial development in the world's history. This factor making for strength and growth was outlined by the British Prime Minister at the Colonial Conference of 1907. He declared that the "essence of the Imperial connection" is to be found in "the freedom and independence of the different governments which are a part of the British Empire." By conferring the gift of genuine self-government Britain has secured to herself the loyal devotion of her daughter states. The latter have experienced a worthy pride in their growing nationality, which at times has been interpreted by cynical foreigners as meaning a desire to break from the Empire and to attempt a complete independence. On the contrary, however, the development of colonial nationality has been accompanied by an increasing sentiment for Britain and the Empire. Lord Milner takes the stand that the development of a Canadian, an Australian, and a South African spirit and patriotism will enhance, rather than threaten, the unity of the Empire. He would base Imperial patriotism on a foundation of colonial patriotism. The strength of the attachment of the colonies for the mother-country has been strikingly illustrated in recent years. Canada in 1897 voluntarily extended to great Britain preferential tariff concessions. This policy, continued by the Dominion to the present time, has since been adopted by her sister states in their commercial relations with

England. This is significant, in view of the mother-country's inability to render reciprocal trade advantages because of her tariff policy which is virtually of a free-trade nature. Canada's attitude with reference to the British preference was unequivocally defined by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, in his reply, in December, 1910, to the requests of the Canadian farmers for freer trade relations with the United States. "Whatever we may be able to accomplish," he declared, "with them (the United States), nothing we do shall in any way impair or affect the British preference. That remains a cardinal feature of our policy."

During the Boer War the colonies again spontaneously showed their loyal attachment to Britain. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, of their own free will, raised and dispatched at their own expense several contingents of colonial soldiers to the scene of action. The latest evidence of the success of British statesmanship has been afforded by the recent unification of South Africa. Incredible as it may seem the Dutch and British of South Africa, who a decade ago were combatants in a destructive war, have united on the common basis of British citizenship in evolving a state which takes its place beside the older dominions. Who in 1899 could possibly have conceived of a Constitution to which would be appended side by side, the names of General Botha, Doctor Jameson (now a baronet), General Smuts, Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, and others who were leaders of the opposing forces during the Boer War? In a message to the *Cape Times*, May 31, 1910, General Botha expressed the hope that United South Africa would become "a peaceful, progressive portion of the Empire."

It would be distinctly reactionary therefore to lament the privilege possessed by the dominions of making their own independent decisions. Even assuming that naval efficiency may possibly be sacrificed, by the establishment of separate navies, such a loss would be more than counterbalanced by the increase of cordiality and loyalty within the Empire. An Empire which is to have any reality "cannot be maintained by pressure from the centre on the circumference," but must exist and flourish by the spontaneous desire of the component parts

to remain in a definite relation to the parent state by accepting the implied obligations. In a recent speech, Sir Wilfrid Laurier declared, and rightly so, that the very basis on which the British empire rests, the basis upon which alone it could be maintained is the autonomy of all its component units. Therefore, notwithstanding the present feelings of loyalty with which the dominions regard Great Britain, care must be had not to trifle with the institution of self-government, that most cherished possession of the colonies. If the dominions are to remain indefinitely in the Empire it must be because none of them would have occasion to wish to leave it.

It is not implied in the above that the dominions ought to proceed to develop their naval and military resources wholly independently of Great Britain. Local effort and local patriotism ought to be guided to a considerable degree by the expert advice of the British admiralty. The colonial navies, although autonomous, should be trained in the spirit of England's historic service. The intelligent development by the dominions of their defence resources would allow the mother-country to concentrate more and more of her attention upon the desired continuance of the two-power standard.

The great problem of Imperial unity is the reconciliation of the spirit of nationality with the idea of a united Empire. The spirit of the Canadian government with reference to this question is well illustrated by an extract from the address of Hon. L. P. Brodeur, the Dominion Minister of Marine and Fisheries, when welcoming the officers and men of the *Niobe*, at Halifax, in October, 1910. "We must consider that our interests," said Mr. Brodeur, "are so interwoven with those of Great Britain that her supremacy on the sea and perpetual command of the great commerce of the world appeal to us and awaken a responsive echo in our country. If, then, we can assist even in a small way, but in proportion to our strength and resources, in the safe-guarding of her supremacy, it becomes our duty to do so. And in this establishment of a Canadian navy for the protection of our commerce and defence of our coasts we are displaying to the world our readiness to do our share in the upbuilding of the Empire."